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ABSTRACT
ITER (short for International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, 
and the Latin word for ‘the way’, as in ‘the way to new energy’), a 
controlled thermonuclear fusion experiment currently being built 
in Cadarache, France, is one of the world’s largest technoscientific 
collaborations. ITER’s complex organisation is rooted in decisions 
taken during the early negotiation phase in the 1990s. This article 
focuses on this initial period of the ITER negotiations, showing the 
importance of reciprocity and compromise in the organizational 
decisions of the project. These decisions were enacted by actors 
and organisations who strived to keep ITER together through con-
tinuous ‘backstage’ diplomacy work. This work included finding 
acceptable compromises for the involved Parties on both a diplo-
matic and scientific level. Looking closely at such work reveals the 
entangled character of science and diplomacy in large international 
technoscientific collaborations, as well as the need for compromise 
to make a project like ITER materialise.
KEYWORDS 
Fusion; ITER; science 
diplomacy; compromise; 
reciprocity; big science
If you will be given as an experienced project manager [. . .] the task to execute this project, 
there is no way you will do it the way we are doing it at the moment. But the ITER 
Agreement, the ITER treaty, is a consequence of: this is how the Japanese think about it, 
this is how the Koreans think about it etc, etc. So, it’s a compromise. 
Akko Maas, Knowledge Management Officer, ITER, 2018
Introduction
The construction of the controlled nuclear fusion experiment ITER (short for 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, as well as the Latin word for ‘the 
way’, as in ‘the way to new energy’), currently underway in Cadarache, Southern France, 
is one of the largest technoscientific collaborations in the world today. The project is 
ambitious in scope as well as in aims: to build knowledge and ability in the fusion field in 
each of the nations involved while simultaneously constructing a functioning ‘first-of-its- 
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kind’ reactor. Building a machine such as ITER is, to say the least, a complicated process, 
where diplomacy, complex management, and negotiation are at the heart of the project. 
This is true not only for the top-level politicians who sign agreements regarding scientific 
collaboration on the so called ‘front-stage’, or the State level, of diplomatic action. It is 
also true for the science policy advisors, scientists, engineers, lawyers, economists, and 
managers working on the project, all the way down to the work site itself where German 
welders may work under Indian supervision following French nuclear-safety protocols. 
One might say that technoscientific diplomacy is performed there on a day-to-day basis. 
The aim of this article is to unpack the way in which actors and organizations have 
strived to keep the project together through the work of ‘backstage’ science diplomacy, 
enacted through reciprocity and compromise in the initial phase of the project.1 I will 
discuss the consequences of early compromises as manifested in the scientific organiza-
tion of ITER and show how scientific and diplomatic decisions are entangled in this 
process. In doing this, I argue that while grand gestures and perhaps grand conflict may 
go on at the front-stage of science diplomacy, on the backstage compromise is necessary 
in order to make a project like ITER materialize.
Reciprocity and compromise in science diplomacy
While the results of ITER are eagerly awaited by many, the project has also been heavily 
criticized.2 One reason for criticism has been its organizational approach, as well as many 
delays and lack of efficiency. As late as 2015 an evaluation almost led to the end of the 
project, before a change in leadership and a revision of the project schedule.3 Even ITER 
personnel admit that the way the project is conceived is, in many ways, unsatisfactory 
from a scientific and project management point of view.4
A case in point: ITER uses an in-kind system, where participants contribute by 
constructing parts of the reactor in their respective countries and then sending them 
for assembly to Cadarache. Around 85 to 90% of ITER project funds are given through 
in-kind contribution. This is a particularly high amount for projects of this scale. While 
an in-kind system is partially used in other big science projects, such as the ongoing 
construction of the European Spallation Source, the ITER machine is almost entirely 
built in this fashion, resulting in a network system with a weak central organization. In 
addition, since the aim is to increase knowledge for all participants, the same component 
is often built simultaneously by several different parties. The vacuum vessel, for example, 
is constructed in both Europe and Korea, and the same kind of magnetic coil is 
manufactured in both Russia and China. Akko Maas, Knowledge Management Officer 
at ITER, has commented regarding the construction of the vacuum vessel that it ‘is the 
first safety barrier. If you would ask any scientist, technologist, or safety person what not 
to do, they will tell you, you have to have the vacuum vessel fabricated by one single 
entity’.5 Yet, at ITER, it is not. One clue as to why the project was developed in this 
distributed fashion can be found in the initial citation from Maas: It represents 
a compromise, and it is based on an ideal of reciprocity.
The concept of reciprocity has been a core characteristic of diplomacy over time.6 The 
ideal of reciprocity in this sense implies equality in exchange, a balance between parties of 
a negotiation. Everybody has to gain something and gain as equally as possible, although 
reciprocity does not imply that all parties involved are necessarily of equal standing.7 
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ITER is an example of so called specific reciprocity, namely ‘situations in which specified 
partners exchange items of equivalent value in strictly delimited sequences’.8 The 
attempts to make sure that reciprocity is ensured during the negotiation and construction 
of ITER has, in turn, resulted in quite a few compromises.
An example of such a compromise developed during the discussion of the siting, when 
the EU decided to propose the French site, Cadarache, as the EU candidate, thus 
bypassing the Spanish site, Vandellos. In order to ensure a certain measure of reciprocity 
for Spain, the European Agency for the Joint Undertaking, responsible for coordinating 
the EU’s in-kind contribution to ITER, was placed in Barcelona instead of at the ITER site 
itself. Bernard Bigot, current Director General of ITER, reminisces a propos the choice of 
placing the Agency for the Joint Undertaking in Vandellos, that ‘it was a trade-off. [. . .] 
But it was the price to pay in order to get out [of the situation]. And you can see how 
maybe [the] wrong decision could be taken, wrong decision from the point of view of 
technical matter, but it is the only way you could make the project move on’.9 This idea, 
that compromise is the only way for the project to survive, is echoed by several members 
of the ITER leadership. As pointed out by G.S. Lee, current Deputy Director General of 
ITER, they had to ‘do it this way, deliver this way, or not do it . . . Either one is not very 
good, but the worst is not doing it’.10
Compromise is another central concept in diplomacy, where it has often been seen as 
a tool of a ‘realist’ mode of diplomacy.11 To reach a compromise can be construed as 
a success, but also as a failure if we consider compromise in the sense of accepting 
standards that are lower than desirable. Meanwhile, despite its centrality, the concept has 
not been much explored in recent science diplomacy work. Those observers who con-
sider science and diplomacy as radically different practices, often refer precisely to the 
tension between the supposed realist necessities of diplomacy as opposed to the idealist 
aspirations of science, and from that perspective, compromise may be a difficult topic to 
tackle.12 For example, the central science diplomacy text published by the Royal Society 
and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 2010 starts 
with the proclamation that science and diplomacy are not ‘obvious bedfellows’, since 
science is ‘in the business of establishing truth, while the opposite may be true of 
diplomacy’.13 Similarly, Turekian et al. point out that while science ‘is neither inherently 
political nor ideological, but represents a type of universal language’, diplomacy is 
‘characterized by dialogues, negotiation and compromise’.14 However, if seen from 
somewhat less essentialist vantage points, diplomacy has both idealist and realist aspira-
tions, insofar as they can be separated, and so does technoscientific work. In particular in 
large international technoscientific projects such as ITER, decisions need to be based on 
both a scientific and a diplomatic rationale, and often these two are entangled.15 Thus, in 
order to understand the way the ITER project is organized, it is vital to explore its origins 
in reciprocity and compromise as well as the ways diplomatic and scientific rationales are 
entangled in the process of project negotiation.
As pointed out by political scientist Alin Fumuresco, ‘compromise looks messy, the 
dreary stuff of day-to-day politics’.16 This ‘dreary’ work of trying to reconcile the wills, 
means and materialities engaged in a large technoscientific project does not happen on 
the front-stage of science diplomacy. Instead, it happens on the backstage among the 
many actors on different levels working on the project and its design, from science and 
technology policy advisors to scientists working at research sites. For the purpose of this 
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article, backstage diplomacy encompasses the practices and processes that both lead up to 
and deal with the consequences of front-stage diplomatic negotiations. This includes the 
work of the ITER council, the Management Advisory Committee and the Technical 
Advisory Committee, as well as the scientific work at the Home Teams and the Joint 
Central Teams. In this article, I will trace this work in the early history of the ITER project 
through the two separate so-named Design Activities, the Conceptual and the 
Engineering, taking place from 1987 to 2001.
The history of the ITER project has been told mainly by actors involved in the project 
over time from different countries through articles and informational material on the 
project. From the Russian perspective, the period that I will be covering has been 
described in the book ITER: A decisive step (ИТЭР: Решающий Шаг) published in 
2004 by the Russian Ministries of Atomic Energy and of Education in collaboration 
with the Moscow State University.17
Two French monographs have also been published on ITER by actors involved in the 
projects. The first is ITER: le chemin des étoiles, by Robert Arnoux and Jean Jacquinot, 
which outlines the history of ITER up until 2006.18 More recently, Michel Claessens, 
former head of communications of ITER, published a monograph on the history of ITER, 
while also engaging in some of the current debates.19 In addition, there is an increasing 
amount of material discussing the pros and cons of the ITER project, including mono-
graphs, articles, podcast episodes, and the documentary ‘Let There be Light’ (2017).20 
A recent example is the book Soleil Trompeur by Isabelle Bourboulon.21 In general, while 
these texts sometimes touch on the origins of ITER, they rarely delve deeper into the 
discussions taking place during the 1990s, but instead focus on the later developments 
regarding the siting procedure and construction start. This article will examine that 
earlier period more closely, to tease out the processes that lay the groundwork for the 
later developments.
Overall, ITER has so far not been the subject of much historical or social science 
research. One exception is Patrick McCray who has examined ITER as an example of 
a global research project and transnationalism in research, focusing on the role of the 
European Union.22 McCray’s description of the political game behind the siting proce-
dure in the early 2000s, shows how fusion is used on the level of front-stage diplomacy, 
and highlights the tensions between national programs and international collaboration. 
These tensions are clear in the processes described in this article.
If largely absent from historical and social science literature, ITER has often been 
used as an example in recent science diplomacy literature. An article was dedicated to it 
in the first ever issue of the journal Science & Diplomacy in 2012, and it features in the 
first chapter of the only edited volume to date on science diplomacy.23 It is further the 
first example in the recent and central volume on science diplomacy by Bruno Ruffini, 
and in the earlier mentioned monograph on the history of ITER, Michel Claessens 
classifies ITER as a diplomatic technology (téchnologie diplomatique).24 In these texts, 
ITER is held up as an example of science diplomacy in the sense of diplomacy aiding 
science collaboration, as well as a successful large international collaboration. Of these 
authors, Claessens is the only one to scrutinize what being a ‘diplomatic technology’ 
might mean in more detail, focusing on the creations of scientific and diplomatic 
communities as well as technology and expertise.25 The way ITER is used in this 
literature aligns with descriptions by Kaltofen and Acuto of how science diplomacy is 
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often conflated with the idea of ‘epistemic communities’, leading to a rather superficial 
description of heterogenous and complex phenomena such as science diplomacy. They 
argue that one way of deepening the analysis would be to use a more practice-based 
approach.26
In the remainder of this article, I will focus on a time period in ITER history that I see 
as crucial for the set-up and organisation of the project, but which is generally glossed 
over in the earlier literature. Further, while McCray has shown the kind of rhetoric and 
processes that have been used on the front-stage of ITER negotiations, my analysis 
focuses on a different level of negotiations, and the decisions needed for the project to 
function in practice. The study also adds to the science diplomacy literature by focusing 
on practices of compromise and reciprocity, as opposed to ideas of science diplomacy as 
predominantly exchange of knowledge and expertise.
The road to ITER
The summit in Geneva in 1985 where Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met for the 
first time is often described as the starting point for ITER. Through lobbying by the 
scientific community from the Soviet Union and the US, and, in particular, through the 
close relation between Mikhail Gorbachev and scientist Evgenii Velikhov, fusion coop-
eration was put on the agenda of the meeting and during the planning phase Japan and 
the European Community (EC) also became involved. Thus, one of the results of the 
summit was an agreement to cooperate in the field of fusion.27
Historically, since the Geneva meetings in 1956 and 1958, when the main fusion (and 
nuclear) powers including the Soviet Union, the US and the UK, formally declassified 
their fusion research, fusion has embodied the possibility for reciprocity and cooperation 
in a high-profile area, without short-term risks.28 The possibility to collaborate in an 
important and highly politicized scientific field while knowing that applicable results 
would only be forthcoming in the long term made fusion fitting for diplomatic relations. 
Historian Barbara Curli has pointed out that the gesture of declassification can already in 
itself be seen as using fusion cooperation as a tool for foreign policy.29 In this vein, fusion 
also became one of the areas for US and USSR cooperation after the Geneva meeting in 
1958.30 During the Cold War, fusion research would repeatedly intersect with interna-
tional, national and regional politics, and, as pointed out by McCray, often as 
a continuation of politics by other means.31 The Geneva meeting of 1985 was no 
exception.
Moreover, during the 1970s, fusion research had entered a more hardware-focused 
phase.32 Up until the end of the 1960s, several types of reactors were envisaged by 
research groups in different countries, making collaboration on a machine challenging. 
However, in late 1960s, the Soviets had an important breakthrough in their tokamak 
reactor design, causing scientists in other countries to turn to the same design.33 The 
Soviet breakthrough led to a heightened interest in fusion technology, and this coincided 
with the oil crisis and new investments in alternative energy during the 1970s. As a result, 
three large tokamaks were constructed during the 1970s and came into operation in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s: the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR, created by the US in 
Princeton), the Japan Torus-60 (JT-60, by Japan in Naka) and the Joint European Torus 
(JET, by the EC in Culham).
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JET was the first international cooperation around the construction of fusion hard-
ware, a result of a European fusion network that had slowly been established over the 
1960s, largely due to the diligent work of the director for the Euratom fusion program, 
Donato Palumbo. JET also became the first so called ‘Joint Undertaking’ of the European 
Communities, and such a setup is also being used for the common European engagement 
in ITER.34 While the JET project in many ways showcased some of the problems that the 
international collaboration around ITER would later face, it paved the way for the 
possibility of the European Community entering ITER as a single, collective actor.
The heightened interest in fusion in the 1970s had prompted the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) to form an International Fusion Research Council, and to gather 
information regarding the objectives of national fusion programs.35 In 1978, the Soviet 
Union proposed an international tokamak collaboration under the auspices of the IAEA, 
with Japan, the US, the EC and the USSR participating.36 This led to a number of 
workshops being initiated by the IAEA, but discussions did not lead to any concrete 
designs, and international cooperation around the peaceful uses of fusion came to suffer 
from heightened tension between the USSR and the US in the early 1980s.
Thus, in 1985, due to earlier collaboration, a research infrastructure, an international 
network and organization around fusion already existed, and even the start of a tokamak 
project including the US and the USSR. In the words of McCray, fusion ‘made sense’ as 
an ‘arena for Cold War Superpower collaboration’.37
However, while the initial agreement in Geneva had been a grand political gesture, 
many actors still hesitated regarding such a large endeavor, and it would take until 1987 
for the parties to meet and officially discuss the project.38 Up until now, while scientific 
collaboration had taken place between national research groups, with the exception for 
JET, national programs had overall retained their autonomy in building larger devices. 
Thus, all involved actors had their own plans for larger tokamaks, so called ‘next step’ 
devices, and their national (and international in the case of the EC) programs competed 
with ITER for resources.39 In Europe, the NET device was seen as the ‘next step’ for 
a fusion reactor, and its conception was developed in parallel to the ITER discussions.40 
Many in the European scientific community were also suspicious of ITER as a political 
project between the two superpowers and did not trust that it would become reality.41
A similar discussion on resource distribution took place in Japan.42 After having 
undertaken smaller experiments during the 1950s and 1960s, in 1975, the Japanese 
government made the fusion program a prioritized national program. This resulted in 
JT-60, and the Japanese researchers worked on their own ‘next step’ machine called the 
Fusion Experimental Reactor (FER).43 In the US, actors similarly hesitated due to the 
expected rivalry between the national programs and the larger one, but also due to 
a reluctance to participate in technological transfer with the Soviet Union.44
Despite these misgivings, global international cooperation was still seen by many 
actors as the only way to be able to build a larger demonstration reactor, since no one 
actor had the resources to do so independently.45 Fusion is technoscience in the sense 
that new technologies are needed both to develop a fusion energy system and to produce 
knowledge on fusion. The research ensembles needed to undertake fusion research are 
resource-heavy, and ‘visible, and accountable to other researchers and to the public, and 
so become more tightly coupled to diverse communities’.46 Thus, as noted by historian 
John Krige in the case of CERN, international collaborations are often ‘born more of 
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pragmatic needs that of an idealistic commitment to “universality”. These “needs” can be 
for scientific, technical, economic and even political support’.47
For example, cost estimates and an inability to nationally produce components for the 
next generation of fusion machines moved the Soviet Union to suggest the INTOR 
collaboration; as well, EC cooperation on JET was motivated by the fact that without 
Euratom support, the national programs in the EC were not likely to secure state 
funding.48 Similarly, the Japanese government saw an opportunity with ITER to share 
the costs of building a demonstration reactor with other parties, and ITER was in the end 
re-conceptualized as a continuation of the Japanese program instead of competing with 
it.49 This tension between the wills and reactor plans of different national research groups 
on one hand, and a perceived need for global cooperation to construct the next large 
fusion device on the other, would to a large extent shape the ITER project organisation.
Ways and means of a fusion reactor: building a structure of reciprocity
Two years after the public declaration of the Geneva summit, in March 1987, delegations 
from the US, the USSR, the EC (through Euratom) and Japan met in Vienna to initiate 
formal discussions at the invitation of IAEA Director General Hans Blix.50 These formal 
front-stage diplomatic discussions set the framework for the ensuing backstage discus-
sions at the level of the ITER council, and at ITER work during the Conceptual Design 
Activities [CDA] that were launched in 1988 and continued until December 1990. These 
discussions were central in forming a structure to ensure reciprocity between the Parties 
in a way that made sense on both a scientific and diplomatic level.51 This would come to 
include reciprocity in the form of organizational power, financial responsibility, task 
division, scientific decision making and representation in terms of staff and work 
location. The decisions made during this period in turn heavily influenced the work 
during the Engineering Design Activities [EDA] that followed.
The organizational structure of the CDA included the ITER Council, the ITER 
Management Committee (IMC) and the ITER Science and Technology Advisory 
Committee (ISTAC).52 Two members from each Party, including scientists and science 
policy administrators, were nominated to the ITER Council, responsible for the overall 
direction of the CDA (and later the EDA), and its execution.53 All decisions in the 
Council were to be made unanimously.54
Krige has noted that the scientific ideal of many physicists is one of shared decision- 
making and power derived from experience and expertise. However, in reality there are often 
informal hierarchies in scientific collaboration, whether they are acknowledged or not, and in 
particular during the construction of a technical artefact decisions may need to be imposed 
from above to a considerable extent.55 Such tensions between ideals of consensus and 
reciprocity in the sense of equal sharing of responsibility, and the actual practice of building 
a machine, would become more pronounced during the EDA, as we will see below.
While representatives of the Parties would work in a team at their home institutions 
(EURATOM for the EU, the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency for Japan, Department of 
Energy for the US and ROSATOM for the USSR), each of the home teams also sent ten 
representatives to do joint work in Garching, near Munich. This joint work did not have 
specific financing; the representatives were stationed there but paid by their home 
teams.56
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The joint work was done at a European site, but the three main chairing positions were 
given to the other Parties. The role of ITER council chairman was given to John Clarke 
from the US Department of Energy; the ISTAC chairman to Boris Kadomtsev from the 
Kurchatov institute; and the Management Committee was chaired by Ken Tomabechi 
from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, JAERI.57 Thus, at this first stage, reciprocity was 
ensured through a rigorous division of organizational labor and responsibility.
Similarly, in terms of the scientific object at hand, the reactor, these first discussions 
were an initial attempt to reconcile the different ideas about what a ‘next step’ machine 
might entail, and thus ensure reciprocity in terms of scientific gain. Each Party had their 
own experimental reactors, differing in size, performance and shape, as well as what the 
reactor was supposed to do or not.58 As pointed out by Denis Willson in his book about 
JET, ‘an immense gulf’ lies between the collaboration to construct a device designed for 
a particular research purpose, ‘and any international cooperation to produce the proto-
type of any viable reactor’.59 There are several ways to bridge such a technical and 
scientific gulf, and the Parties needed to find compromises that all could agree on, and 
which would benefit not only the ITER project as such, but each institution’s own fusion 
research, in view of the tensions between the larger project and the national programs.
However, the ‘gulf’ between building a research device and an industrial prototype is 
not only technical.60 In order to address the transition from the CDA to the EDA, in 
July 1989 the ITER Council decided to charter a working group to explore possible ‘ways 
and means’ for the EDA, to find the ‘best reconciliation possible between technical, 
administrative and political needs and possibilities’ on the way forward.61 The discus-
sions in the group regarded to a large extent reciprocity in terms of intellectual property, 
procurement, financial organization and siting.
Procurement was a central concern, as it determined the task division among Parties 
and the aim was to divide Research & Development (R&D) tasks and other contributions 
between the home institutions in a fair manner. Several models were initially discussed, 
some more ‘centralized’ and others ‘decentralized’. The more centralized ones meant that 
a strong central team was responsible for the contract design with an open call for 
a tender and a selection from offered industrial contracts. The decentralized model, on 
the other hand, would mean that each of the home teams was responsible for an equal 
part of the R&D, even perhaps going so far as each Party contributing one quarter of the 
modules of each component.62 While the EC had already used a centralized model at JET, 
and considered it to be more efficient than a de-centralized one, it seems as if other 
Parties found the competitive tendering policy difficult to comprehend and wanted 
a variant which allowed for less cash flow across frontiers.63
In the report of the Working Group, a kind of hybrid model was proposed as 
a compromise, where a general set of tasks was defined at the outset of the EDA, with 
the help of which the project Director would develop and propose an allocation of 
comprehensive packages to the Council. After allocation, the individual Parties would 
themselves organize the fulfilment of their work packages, either by their own personnel 
or by procurement from other sources. A Joint Central Team (JCT) under the leadership 
of the ITER Director would be responsible for design integration work. The working 
group also suggested a system that did not require transfer of funds across the Parties’ 
boundaries, and would thereby be independent of exchange rates, labor rates, overhead 
rates and other similar complications.64 This ‘currency’ so to speak was called the ITER 
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Unit of Account (IUA), or ITER credits.65 Thus, both the task allocation system and the 
IUA became tools for equal division of labor and benefits between Parties with vastly 
different labor contexts. At the same time, this arrangement allowed for all Parties to 
engage in knowledge production, which was one of the main aims of the project. Thus, 
ideally, such a model would ensure reciprocity both in terms of scientific benefit, and in 
terms of amount of scientific work performed. In the EDA agreement, such reciprocity 
would be formulated as a ‘principle of equality of the Parties with regard to their status in, 
their contributions to, and their benefits from the cooperation’.66
A more challenging issue proved to be agreeing on a Joint Central Team Site. The idea 
was to have a central team based at a single site during the EDA, to which personnel from 
the different Parties would be relocated.67 In February 1991, new front-stage 
Quadripartite EDA Negotiations started that included the main actors from each institu-
tion involved, as well as formal diplomatic representatives from the Parties. The aim of 
the negotiation was to sign the EDA agreement. At the first meeting, three Parties 
proposed to host the JCT: Naka (Japan), Garching (Germany) and San Diego (US).68 
At the second negotiation meeting, it became clear that none of the Parties were willing to 
withdraw their offers, and the quantifiable comparison of the sites did not lead to a clear 
view of the best option.69 Thus a new task force was created with the mission to 
investigate the consequences of dividing the JCT over two or even all three proposed 
sites.
The draft report of the task force concluded that a single-site solution would be the 
best solution but having two or three co-sites were also considered viable options. The 
risks of the latter solution, in comparison with the single-site solution, was the loss of 
strong central leadership and efficient communication needed for a project of the 
technical complexity and international charter of ITER, as well as increased cost- 
estimates and concerns regarding personnel recruitment.70 The advantages of a multi- 
site solution were the close connection to each host Party’s home program, as well as 
heightened visibility and support in the three countries. If successful, it could also 
provide a new model for international mega-projects, which was an ITER Council 
objective.71 The connections to each home program as well as the heightened visibility 
was important in light of the earlier mentioned competition between the national 
programs and the international project. ITER could not be seen as a rival to the national 
programs, especially in terms of shared funding.72 The list of disadvantages of a multi-site 
solution was, however, double the length compared to the list of advantages, although the 
delegates’ view of the risk of a multisite-solution ‘varied from small to significant’.73
Despite this, at the third meeting of the Quadripartite Negotiations, the negotiating 
parties accepted the solution of three co-centers ‘of equivalent importance’ as well as 
naming Moscow (the Soviet Union had not proposed to host a site) the formal seat of the 
ITER Council.74 At stake in these discussions was the reciprocity between the Parties, as 
well as the control over the overall program and its connection to the scientific work of 
each home team. Considering the strong practical case for a single-site solution, it may be 
concluded that a diplomatic rationale rather than a scientific one underpinned this 
decision. Meanwhile, as pointed out above, the national research teams also had an 
interest in ensuring that the scientific work had a close connection to each national 
research program to legitimize the participation in the project. Further, the EDA would 
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also mean a much higher economic stake than the CDA, and all Parties wanted to assure 
benefit from their investments.
The decisions to use a de-centralized procurement organization of ITER, as well as the 
split JCT are fundamental ones taken against a backdrop of efforts to ensure reciprocity 
in a large technoscientific project that exists in the tension between international coop-
eration and national research, between technoscience and politics, and between back-
stage and front-stage politics. While these decisions can be seen as necessary to ensure the 
project’s development, they would also lead to complications during the EDA.
A ‘particularly challenging’ project: the consequences of reciprocity
When the EDA started at the first ITER Council meeting in Vienna in September 1992, 
the set up was complex, to say the least. In addition to the ITER Council, the Home 
Teams (HT), and the Joint Central Team (JCT), now divided over three different Joint 
Work Sites, two permanent advisory committees, the Technical Advisory Committee 
(TAC) and Management Advisory Committee (MAC), were set up with the task to 
review the work of the JCT and the HT, and report to the ITER Council.75 Each Joint 
team site had a deputy director elected for sites outside of their home countries.76 Except 
for the Director and the Deputy Directors, each Home Team also had a Home Team 
Leader (HTL).
Activities continued to take place under the auspices of the IAEA, which provided not 
only an official multilateral body and a close connection to the rest of the nuclear 
community not directly involved in ITER, but also practical assistance with publications 
and economic administration.77 Adding to the above was a plethora of contact persons, 
expert groups, special working groups, special review groups and specialized research 
groups, as well as contacts with industrial actors, and the fusion community at large. This 
complex set-up soon led to challenges and the need for compromises on several levels, as 
well as struggles between the Home Teams and the Joint Central Teams.
As a part of this complexity, the set-up of the EDA had a built-in tension between the 
idea of decision-making through consensus, and the delegation of authority needed to 
manage such a complex hardware project. The Ways and Means working group had 
emphasized the strong authority of leadership and clear management structure needed 
due to the division of the JCT, and the EDA agreement clearly stated that the Parties 
should ‘refrain from giving any instructions to their members of the Joint Central Team 
that may introduce conflict with the Director’s management authority’.78 Meanwhile, the 
rules guiding procedures for the ITER Council, MAC, and TAC as well as Special 
Working groups proposed a decision-making process that would strive for consensus, 
and each Party had to speak with one voice. In the ITER Council, as well as most Special 
Working groups, all decisions were made unanimously, while the TAC and MAC could 
make majority decisions in the case that consensus was impossible.79
According to the de-centralized model of procurement and R&D tasks the principle of 
equality of the Parties would ideally also apply to the task division. Tasks were assigned 
through a process by which the director ‘through close interaction with the Home Team 
Leaders’ decided on appropriate task packages as well as which Home Team to assign it to 
and how many ITER units each task was worth. The larger task assignments were 
approved by the Council.80 Task assignment procedures needed to be constantly 
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discussed and negotiated in terms of new tasks, task package size, and lack of integration 
due to split or overlapping tasks among the Parties.81
In addition, national contexts affected the possibilities for Parties to fulfil their tasks. 
As an example, the Russian Federation remained in the ITER collaboration after the 
Soviet Union had dissolved, but the Party was clearly having trouble fulfilling both tasks 
and staffing, owing to the financial and political situation of the early Russian Federation 
as well as Russian academia at the time.82 A guideline regarding ‘Inadequate Performance 
by a Party on Design and R&D tasks’ had been formulated, but in practice, the Parties 
could only work around this problem as best they could. Thus, while the rules of 
reciprocity were very clearly set, they could in this case be compromised if one of the 
actors could not fulfill their part of the deal. One reason for why such a compromise was 
possible was the long-standing trust-building between the Parties. It is important to note 
that the Parties involved in ITER were all there due to their prominence in fusion 
research, and many of the actors had collaborated before. The fusion community that 
had developed over time had also allowed for a certain trust-building and knowledge 
about the capacities of the other Parties. In such a community, certain compromise can 
be allowed for even though the participants do not fulfil exact specific reciprocity.83
The first years of the EDA were thus marked by the efforts of putting into place 
a functioning management structure for the project in view of the complex organization 
outlined above. These difficulties translated, among other things, into conflicts between 
the ITER Council and the Director, which would lead to the Director, Paul-Henri Rebut, 
stepping down in 1994, to be replaced by Robert Aymar.84 Rebut later commented that 
he considered that the quest for compromise often overrode the real needs of the 
project.85 The management issues, however, were not only due to tensions between the 
Director and the IC, but also to those between the Joint Central Team and the Home 
Teams. In his inaugural speech to the ITER Council, the new director described what he 
considered to be the conditions for achieving consensus in a technical project: That every 
Party and every actor in every Party accept that they will ‘follow a decision taken in the 
interest of the project, rather than in accordance with its own proposal. It is the HT 
responsibility to find solutions for conflicting interests, but always to meet the needs of 
the project, the success of which is vital for their own national program’.86 Aymar here 
pointed to the everyday compromises that needed to be made between ITER and the 
Home Team programs, a tension that had been present from the very start. The tension 
was eased by giving the Home Teams more influence on task assignment and overall 
research design, thus increasing the de-centralized decision-making.87
While Aymar’s declaration that the success of ITER was vital for the national pro-
grams offers one way of seeing these developments, it was also true that the relevance of 
ITER to the national programs was necessary to the project’s existence. In principle, the 
most concerning risk for the ITER collaboration, and one main rationale for all the ideals 
regarding equality and consensus, was the fact that if a Party did not feel it benefited, or 
achieved reciprocity, from the collaboration, it could simply leave.
As noted, each Party had their special interest to defend regarding what ITER should 
do, depending on national energy policy and research specialties. As an example, for 
Japan, fusion was perceived as an important technology to help fill an urgent perceived 
energy need in the country and their side was thus more invested in a machine that would 
quickly lead to industrial production. Meanwhile, in the US, many researchers were in 
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favor of smaller scale experiments on already existing machines until some of the many 
unsolved scientific issues were handled, and the Department of Energy did not consider 
a new type of energy production as urgent.88 Overall, the US was the Party whose 
national fusion efforts were the least devoted to tokamaks.89
These competing interests led to conflicts regarding the scientific specifications of 
ITER. The technoscientific discussions between the Technical Advisory Committee, Joint 
Central Teams and the Home Teams of the four Parties show different views on issues 
such as materials, blanket construction, physics, interpretations of safety parameters, heat 
calculations, and resources allocated to parallel solutions.90 As an example, the issue of 
whether to construct a shielding blanket that would also breed tritium led to discussions 
on materials, how much resources to spend on breeding capabilities, and the organiza-
tional responsibility for its design. Over time a strategy developed that had the Joint 
Central Team designing a blanket shield in modules for the first phase of ITER perfor-
mance, leaving the Home Teams on their own to design breeding blanket modules to be 
installed at a later phase.91 This set up was strongly criticized at an early stage by the 
Russian TAC members, who argued that the goals of the EDA protocol (which included 
tritium breeding) could be jeopardized if the blanket program was set up this way.92 The 
different views of the characteristics of the machine also affected the main issue of 
discussion: the size and cost. During the first years, the machine grew to large propor-
tions in order to accommodate all the wishes of the Parties.93
Over the years, criticism of the project grew in the US and in 1998 that Party decided 
to leave the ITER collaboration. While the technical discussions and management issues 
were certainly part of the reason, the deciding factors for the withdrawal were national 
finances and politics.94 In addition to the US leaving the collaboration, Japan, which had 
been considered the most likely country to host the machine, was assailed by financial 
crisis, and asked for a three-year delay for the planned construction phase.95 Russia was 
still not financially able to contribute fully to a construction and was at this point not able 
to contribute with funds.96 Moreover, at this point in time, oil prices had gone down, and 
many of the rationales for a fusion reactor both as a Cold War project and a way out of 
the energy crises were weaker.
Despite this, work was continued by the remaining Parties to produce a final report in 
2001, but with a cut to the cost of the design of fifty percent, thus reducing the technical 
objectives.97 This meant reducing the size of the tokamak as well as compromising on 
what had been one of the main scientific objectives of the machine, namely to reach 
ignition in a burning plasma, thus making the plasma sustain itself indefinitely.98
During the EDA, many of the structures of reciprocity that had been set up for ITER 
turned out to be problematic for the everyday work of the project. The entanglement 
between different technical, economic and social interests within and outside of the 
project as well as the real fear of Parties withdrawing from the collaboration had to be 
handled at every step of the way, resulting in compromises on all levels.
Conclusion
The history of international collaboration on fusion research shows how cooperation has 
always been entangled with and carried out through diplomatic and political means. 
However, as both the scientific and diplomatic character of the collaboration has changed 
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over time, so have the ways that actors have been forced to consider reciprocity and 
compromise. In particular, as the more collaborations turned multilateral and hardware 
oriented, the more economic, political and scientific compromises needed to be made.
In the case of the early history of ITER, this meant arranging for reciprocity in order to 
ensure both political and scientific participation. Based on such reciprocity, the Parties 
strived to make as optimal as possible decisions from both a diplomatic and a scientific 
point of view that all Parties could accept. Meanwhile, in such a project, diplomatic and 
scientific decisions are entangled. These decisions were made through compromise 
during the everyday grind of backstage scientific and diplomatic work on different levels 
of ITER. They needed to accommodate tensions between the aims of the project itself and 
those of the national research teams, as well as between the will to create and share new 
scientific knowledge on the one hand and build a working industrial machine on the 
other. They were also dependent on the different social, political and economic contexts 
of the participating Parties.
While compromises were made on the levels of organization, scientific practice, and 
the characteristics of the machine, certain economic issues were more difficult to 
compromise on. Economic issues instead led to a complete reimagination of the 
machine, as well as, in the case of Russia, a Party not being able to contribute financially. 
In the case of the US, economy was cited as the main reason for the Party to leave the 
collaboration. On the other hand, it is important to note that the US also was the Party 
who had the least investment in the particular technical solution proposed in the project. 
Thus, they counted the least on reciprocity in terms of scientific return.
The consequences of the entanglement between diplomatic and scientific decisions 
continue to show in the ITER project today. After the EDA ended in 2001, the siting and 
further ITER negotiations would take six more years, and during this time the US re- 
joined the project, while three other Parties, Korea, China and India, joined.99 At this 
point ITER has become one of the largest scientific collaborations in the world, and it 
may thus be seen as a successful compromise in terms of the achievements of the project 
so far. Meanwhile, many organizational structures of the early period of the project have 
remained, including the de-centralized model, and the current in-kind system which 
resembles the task assignment procedure. Leadership issues as well as the management 
complexity of the geographical split between the Home Teams, ITER institutions and the 
ITER site itself have continued to haunt the project and affect its work. The de- 
centralized organization, in particular, was one of the main points of discussion during 
the assessment in 2015. Thus, this organisation can also be seen as risking compromising 
the project and its goals. Nevertheless, it is clear that the current organizational and 
scientific set-up of ITER cannot be fully understood unless it is put in a historical context 
of both diplomatic and scientific compromises.
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